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Abstract 
 A new aircraft surveillance system, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
(ADS-B), is being introduced by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) with 
mandated implementation in the United States by the year 2020.  The rapid deployment 
of the system with current test-beds spread across the U.S. leaves very little chance for 
anyone to test the abilities of the system and more importantly the flaws of the system.   
 The research conducted within this thesis explores some of the weaknesses of the 
system to include the relative ease with which false aircraft targets can be injected.  As 
part of a proof of concept, false ADS-B messages were successfully generated using a 
system comprised of GNU Radio, a Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP), and 
software developed by the author. 
   The ability to generate, transmit, and insert spoofed ADS-B messages on the 
display of a commercial ADS-B receiver, identified and exploited a weakness of the 
ADS-B system.  Four demonstrations, conducted within an experimental environment, 
displayed the potential uses of the system created through this research and its associated 
impacts.   
 
v 
Acknowledgments 
 I would like to thank my thesis advisor(s) Lt Col David Robinson and Dr. Robert 
Mills for their patience and stellar support throughout the entire process of developing 
this thesis.      
 I’d also like to thank my entire family back at home.  You’ve had a hand in the 
successes I’ve been able to enjoy and molded me into the person I am today.  I am 
eternally grateful for all that you have done. 
 Last, but certainly not least, I’d like to thank my wife and son.  You gave me the 
strength and support to pursue a monumental task and push through the many obstacles 
along the way.  I could not have done this without you! 
 
 
       Domenic Magazu III 
vi 
Table of Contents 
Page 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... vi 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... ix 
List of Equations ................................................................................................................ xi 
I.  Introduction .....................................................................................................................1 
1.1 General Issue ..........................................................................................................1 
1.2 Problem Statement..................................................................................................2 
1.3 Research Objectives ...............................................................................................3 
1.4 Research Focus .......................................................................................................3 
1.5 Investigative Questions ..........................................................................................4 
1.6 Approach ................................................................................................................4 
1.7 Implications ............................................................................................................5 
1.8 Preview ...................................................................................................................5 
II. Literature Review ............................................................................................................6 
2.1 Chapter Overview ...................................................................................................6 
2.2 ATC History ...........................................................................................................6 
2.3 NextGen Solution .................................................................................................11 
2.4 Advantages of NextGen .......................................................................................15 
2.5 Vulnerabilities of ADS-B .....................................................................................19 
2.6 ADS-B Test Equipment ........................................................................................22 
2.7 Universal Software Radio Peripheral ...................................................................24 
2.8 FPGA/Digital Down Conversion .........................................................................25 
vii 
2.9 GNU Radio Basics ...............................................................................................26 
2.10 Summary.............................................................................................................27 
III. Methodology ................................................................................................................28 
3.1 Chapter Overview .................................................................................................28 
3.2 Hardware and Software ........................................................................................28 
3.3 Commercial ADS-B Receiver ..............................................................................32 
3.4 USRP ADS-B Receiver Install .............................................................................34 
3.5 Demodulating the Pulse Train ..............................................................................36 
3.6 USRP and ADS-B Transmission ..........................................................................43 
3.7 ADS-B Message Generation ................................................................................47 
3.8 Summary...............................................................................................................52 
IV. Analysis and Results ....................................................................................................53 
4.1 Chapter Overview .................................................................................................53 
4.2 Validation of ADS-B Systems..............................................................................53 
4.3 Demonstrating the DF17MessageGenerator and ADS-B Transmitter .................57 
4.4 Summary...............................................................................................................64 
V.  Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................................65 
5.1 Chapter Overview .................................................................................................65 
5.2 Conclusions of Research ......................................................................................65 
5.3 Investigative Questions Answered .......................................................................65 
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research................................................................67 
5.5 Summary...............................................................................................................68 
Appendix A ........................................................................................................................69 
Appendix B ........................................................................................................................70 
viii 
Appendix C ........................................................................................................................81 
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................83 
ix 
List of Figures 
 Figure Page 
Figure 1 – Graphical representation of PSR and SSR ........................................................ 9 
Figure 2 – Rapid air growth over the next decade and a half. .......................................... 10 
Figure 3 – Major components of the ADS-B system ........................................................ 12 
Figure 4 – Broadcasting of ADS-B squitter message ....................................................... 14 
Figure 5 – Diagram showing the fields of the ADS-B message ....................................... 14 
Figure 6 – Manchester encoding ....................................................................................... 15 
Figure 7 – ADS-B equipment aboard an oil rig ................................................................ 16 
Figure 8 – Map showing ADS-B ground facility status. .................................................. 21 
Figure 9 – SBS-1eR virtual radar screen currently tracking two aircraft ......................... 23 
Figure 10 – Aircraft information displayed by SBS-1eR ................................................. 23 
Figure 11 – USRP N200 ................................................................................................... 24 
Figure 12 – USRP block diagram ..................................................................................... 25 
Figure 13 – System block diagram for testing/troubleshooting ........................................ 30 
Figure 14 – WBX daughterboard ...................................................................................... 31 
Figure 15 – Front and rear view of SBS-1eR ................................................................... 33 
Figure 16 – SBS-1eR virtual radar screen currently tracking an aircraft ......................... 33 
Figure 17 – Command window displaying the GR-AIR-MODES program running ........ 35 
Figure 18 – 120 microsecond ADS-B message waveform ............................................... 37 
Figure 19 – ADS-B message format. ................................................................................ 38 
Figure 20 – Q bit representation for altitude ..................................................................... 39 
Figure 21 – Latitude (left) and longitude (right) zone boundaries .................................... 40 
x 
Figure 22 – GRC screenshot containing the ADS-B Transmitter application ................... 44 
Figure 23 – GRC view of the ADS-B troubleshooting application .................................. 45 
Figure 24 – Scope plot of transmitted message ................................................................ 46 
Figure 25 – Scope plot of received message ..................................................................... 46 
Figure 26 – Latitude and longitude measurements ........................................................... 48 
Figure 27 – Side-by-side view of SBS-1eR (left) and GR-AIR-MODES (right) .............. 54 
Figure 28 – SBS-1eR captured data .................................................................................. 55 
Figure 29 – GR-AIR-MODES captured data ..................................................................... 55 
Figure 30 – Raw data displayed by GR-AIR-MODES ...................................................... 55 
Figure 31 – DF17MessageGenerator validation message................................................ 56 
Figure 32 – System block diagram for implementation/use ............................................. 57 
Figure 33 – ADS-B Transmitter validation ....................................................................... 57 
Figure 34 – Google Earth view of multi-aircraft scenario ................................................ 58 
Figure 35 – SBS-1eR software view of multi-aircraft scenario ........................................ 59 
Figure 36 – Entering altered data for live data scenario ................................................... 60 
Figure 37 – Series of SBS-1eR screen captures for live aircraft demonstrations ............. 61 
Figure 38 – Radar display for aircraft following scenario ................................................ 62 
Figure 39 – SBS-1eR radar picture of false aircraft track ................................................ 63 
 
xi 
List of Equations 
 Equation Page 
Equation 1 ......................................................................................................................... 41 
Equation 2 ......................................................................................................................... 41 
Equation 3 ......................................................................................................................... 42 
Equation 4 ......................................................................................................................... 42 
Equation 5 ......................................................................................................................... 42 
Equation 6 ......................................................................................................................... 47 
Equation 7 ......................................................................................................................... 49 
Equation 8 ......................................................................................................................... 50 
Equation 9 ......................................................................................................................... 50 
Equation 10 ....................................................................................................................... 51 
Equation 11 ....................................................................................................................... 51 
1 
EXPLOITING THE AUTOMATIC DEPENDENT SURVEILLANCE-
BROADCAST SYSTEM VIA FALSE TARGET INJECTION 
 
I.  Introduction 
1.1 General Issue 
 Around December 17, 2009, it was reported that militants in Iraq had purportedly 
used $26 off-the-shelf software to intercept unencrypted live video feeds from United 
States Predator drones.   Data captured could have provided the militants with 
information detrimental to US operations.  The Wall Street Journal marked this incident 
“the emergence of a shadow cyber war within the U.S.-led conflicts overseas” [1].  
Bringing this issue to modern day, imagine an adversary capable of receiving and 
displaying the exact location of all U.S. and allied aircraft performing missions over 
hostile territory.  This hypothetical scenario is becoming a reality with the 
implementation of the latest Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) aircraft surveillance 
system, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B).   
 In an effort to save fuel and money while enhancing aircraft safety, the FAA has 
begun actions to overhaul their traditional radar based surveillance system with a next 
generation (NextGen) solution based on ADS-B technology.  Rather than relying on 
ground based radar to determine an aircraft’s position, a unit onboard the aircraft 
determines the exact coordinates of the aircraft using the Global Positioning System 
(GPS) satellite constellation.  That information is then automatically reported via air-to-
ground and air-to-air data communication links at a fixed rate, depending on the aircraft’s 
current state (enroute, taxiing, etc.).  Because aircraft traffic volume is growing at a 
phenomenal rate, approaching the limits of current systems, the swift implementation of a 
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new system is vital.  For that reason, like any new technological advancement, security 
may not always be at the forefront of the system’s development.   
1.2 Problem Statement 
 The implementation of a new aircraft surveillance system has far reaching 
implications on the commercial sector as well as military.  The NextGen system 
significantly enhances aircraft safety and efficiency, but the security of the system is a 
great concern.  In particular, the air-to-air communications are unencrypted and 
unauthenticated.  One must consider the vulnerability of such a system that does not 
encrypt or authenticate their communications.  In fact, research by McCallie et al. [2] 
investigated several specific attack scenarios and the severity level of each attack; 
however no solutions were developed to carry out these scenarios.   
 Commercial aircraft companies are in the process of determining how to equip 
their fleets with the appropriate equipment in order to meet the FAA mandate.  In 
addition, military program offices are cautiously planning the extent of implementation 
with security and financial concerns at the forefront.  As the mandated deadline for ADS-
B implementation draws closer, aircraft are forced into compliance without answers to 
multiple security questions.  The problem does not stop at American borders.  There are 
already areas of the world that have implemented ADS-B.  For example, the entire 
continent of Australia has full coverage of ADS-B and utilizes this resource for 
commercial aircraft surveillance [3].  Other large projects to implement the new system 
include China [4].  A complete look at the security of ADS-B should be instituted before 
the world commits whole heartedly to a new system shrouded with security concerns.   
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This research, in particular, presents a proof-of-concept demonstration of how false 
targets can be generated.   
1.3 Research Objectives 
 The purpose of this research is to demonstrate the relative ease of generating 
ADS-B messages using arbitrary data.  Furthermore, the system developed to generate 
ADS-B messages relies on inexpensive hardware and software to display the versatility 
one may have in designing such a system.  The hardware to be used is a Universal 
Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) as the radio frequency (RF) front end and GNU radio 
as the development toolkit to build the software defined radio (SDR) application for 
signal processing.   
 Once the system is created, it will help resolve many questions proposed towards 
the safety and security of ADS-B.  In particular, can an individual receive and display 
aircraft in real-time?  Can aircraft messages be spoofed?  If spoofing is possible, can the 
messages be inserted and displayed on a commercial ADS-B receiver?  
1.4 Research Focus 
 The focus of this research is on positional ADS-B messages.  ADS-B contains 
multiple subtype formats for broadcasting aircraft data, this research will focus on 
downlink format (DF) 17, subtype 5 messages.  These messages contain information such 
as aircraft ID, altitude, latitude, and longitude, which provide the potential for false 
targets to be inserted on a radar display. 
 In addition to the 1090 MHz frequency, the FAA has approved the 978 MHz 
Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) link for use by general aviation aircraft flying at 
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lower altitudes.  Although this link is used for ADS-B data communication it was not 
included within the scope of this research.   
1.5 Investigative Questions 
 This research hopes to answer several questions 
1. What is required to generate properly encoded ADS-B messages? 
2. How can a system comprised of a USRP and GNU Radio be developed both to 
generate and transmit ADS-B messages? 
3. If a system can be built, will it remain relatively inexpensive? 
4. How can false ADS-B messages be inserted into the ADS-B network? 
1.6 Approach 
 Using various sources, most notably, Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics (RTCA) meeting notes [6], a system was created with the ability to generate 
ADS-B messages and subsequently broadcast them.  In conjunction with a digital signal 
processing application, C++ code was written to generate the messages and perform 
proper preparations to transmit those messages.  The process included multiple encoding 
equations and finally the transformation into hexadecimal representation to ensure the 
proper waveform for ADS-B messages.   
 After building the system, several demonstrations were generated and tested.  The 
success of the demonstrations was recorded and discussed to prove or disprove the 
potential uses of the system created. 
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1.7 Implications 
 McCallie et al. [2] introduced some potential vulnerabilities of ADS-B.  This 
research goes even further by demonstrating how those weaknesses can be exposed 
successfully.  Those affected by these weaknesses include multi-billion dollar 
commercial airlines and military aircraft, within the U.S. and around the globe.   
1.8 Preview 
  This document is outlined in the following manner.  Chapter II provides an in-
depth literature review on aircraft surveillance history, ADS-B, digital signal processing, 
software defined radio, and the USRP family.  Chapter III describes the system 
development for the proof of concept system.  Chapter IV contains results, discussion, 
and analysis of the system’s capabilities.  Finally, Chapter V contains conclusions, a 
summary of the research performed, and recommendations for future research related to 
ADS-B message exploitation.    
6 
II. Literature Review 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter presents an overview of past, present, and future Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) systems in order to provide background necessary to understand how the current 
system came into use, why this system needs to be replaced, and an introduction into 
future generation ATC systems.  With regard to the future ATC systems, the focus of this 
review will be on the main area of this research, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B).  The chapter also includes information pertaining to software 
defined radio, digital signal processing (DSP), and the USRP family.    
2.2 ATC History 
 2.2.1 Early ATC Techniques 
 During the early stages of flight, little to no equipment existed for in-flight 
navigational aids.  In addition, there was no governing body within the United States to 
set and enforce standards, giving the appearance that improvements to navigation would 
not come quickly.  Pilots relied on a single ground controller using flags during the day 
or a light at night to signal instructions to takeoff, land, or turn.  Because there was no 
capability, such as radios, to communicate information during flight, the controller would 
inform the pilot of weather information or the presence of other aircraft in the same route 
before takeoff.  Weather changes or other pertinent information could not be relayed to 
the pilot once they were off the ground [7].   
 Pilots also had to use known landmarks such as cities, railroad tracks, and/or 
water towers to determine their position and make any necessary corrections.  This can be 
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compared to Visual Flight Rules (VFR) used today.  VFR are established by the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and allow a pilot to operate the aircraft in a free-flight 
manner when conditions allow proper operation and control [8].  The pilot assumes 
responsibility for separation from other aircraft.   
 Shortly after these techniques, a slight improvement was introduced utilizing 
lighted runways or beacons set apart by a mandated distance [7].  This improved VFR 
flying, however, as air traffic increased each year, the need for better instruments when 
navigating through poor conditions (i.e. adverse weather) was essential, resulting in radar 
based systems becoming the navigational aid of choice.   
 2.2.2 Introduction of RADAR 
  Radio detection and ranging, also known as radar, was developed during World 
War II.  Its design was shrouded in secrecy, but shortly after the war completed, its 
benefits were revealed, and the use of radar for both military and commercial use became 
more prevalent.  Radar works through the emission of electromagnetic (radio frequency) 
waves by a directional or rotating antenna dish.  Those radio waves then reflect off an 
object and return back to the source where the signal is gathered by a receiver and the 
target is placed on the plan position indicator (PPI), the display within the ATC tower [9].  
A typical radar system is comprised of secondary surveillance radar (SSR) and primary 
surveillance radar (PSR).  These are coupled with radio communications to form a 
complete ATC system.  These systems came about during the 1950’s which marked the 
beginning of radar use for ATC purposes [10].  
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 2.2.3 Present ATC System  
 During the late 1950’s, the U.S. government became involved with air traffic 
management and regulation through the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, signed by 
President Eisenhower [22].  This Act created the Federal Aviation Agency which later 
became the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).  Since that time, the FAA has taken 
action to administer and enforce regulations, develop and maintain the national 
infrastructure, and monitor the air picture across the United States of America.  To date, 
the FAA controls 750 ATC facilities, 18,000 airports, and 4,500 air navigation facilities 
providing complete coverage of the National Airspace System (NAS) [2].  The cost to 
maintain and operate these facilities is quite large.  Approximately 150 million dollars is 
spent each year in operational and maintenance costs by the FAA [11].  As the systems 
continue to age, maintenance costs continue to escalate, which is a primary motivation 
for ADS-B implementation. 
 As discussed earlier, most modern ATC systems are comprised of PSR and SSR.  
PSR works solely on the signal reflecting off an aircraft or other object and the reflected 
signal returning to the receiver, normally positioned in the same location as the 
transmitter.  The orientation of the radar antenna determines the bearing of the aircraft 
relative to the radar site, while the distance is determined by the length of time it takes for 
the signal to be emitted and for the reflected signal to return to the origin of the 
transmission [12].  PSR is completely passive and does not require any action from the 
object being tracked.  The main disadvantage of PSR is that it can reflect off birds, 
ground objects, and atmospheric phenomena, which can cause issues for air traffic 
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controllers.  Due to this disadvantage, PSR has been augmented with Air Traffic Control 
Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS), also known as SSR. 
 SSR employs special equipment onboard the target aircraft.  Interrogation signals 
are sent from the ground station antenna just as with PSR.  Once an aircraft receives the 
interrogation signal, a transponder aboard the aircraft returns a coded reply signal 
containing information such as aircraft identification and altitude.  Because the aircraft 
transmits the reply message, SSR provides greater signal strength which translates to 
greater range and improved performance.  SSR also decreases the power needed by the 
ground station transmission since the signal will not need to reflect and return [Figure 1].   
 
 
Figure 1 - Graphical representation of PSR and SSR [13]  
 
One drawback of SSR is its dependent nature, with dedicated equipment on the ground 
and on the aircraft.  In most cases, PSR and SSR will be coupled together to 
accommodate both aircraft with and without transponders.  Additionally, PSR is required 
for air defense, detecting non-cooperative targets.    
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 2.2.4 Current ATC Limitations  
 Current radar systems are quickly reaching their maximum capacity due to 
shortcomings in visibility propagation, limitation of line-of-sight, limitation of voice 
communications and the lack of digital data links [14][15].  Additionally, synchronous 
garbling is another concern in which the interrogation signal of SSR invokes a response 
from more than one aircraft, causing the replies sent by both aircraft to overlap at the 
receiver leading to loss of information at the ATC facility.   
 Compounding the interference of messages is the rapid growth of air traffic.  Air 
traffic has increased 32% within the last decade and is projected to nearly double by the 
year 2028 [Figure 2].  Currently, air traffic controllers handle 9 to 15 aircraft at any one 
point.  With the current radar system and projected increase in air traffic, experts believe 
controllers could be required to handle approximately 45 aircraft at any one point, a 
situation that is infeasible to manage and completely unsafe [16] [17]. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Rapid air growth over the next decade and a half.  Expected to double air 
traffic by 2025 [18]. 
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2.3 NextGen Solution 
 2.3.1 FAA Decision   
 With the release of the FAA’s final decision [19], they solidified their choice to 
move forward with the implementation of ADS-B technology as part of the next 
generation (NextGen) national airspace system.  In addition, in August of 2007, the FAA 
awarded the International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) corporation a contract to field a 
national system capable of providing a comprehensive set of ADS-B services for the 
United States [20] [21].  Because the FAA is charged with providing a safe and efficient 
airspace for both civil and military aircraft [22], the armed services are also affected by 
the FAA’s decision.   
 2.3.2 ADS-B Around the World 
 ADS-B is also being adopted on a global scale.  Europe has a slightly more 
aggressive implementation plan with hope of wide spread implementation by 2015 as 
compared to 2020 for implementation within the U.S. [23] [24].  ADS-B standardization 
in Europe is being driven by the Requirements Focus Group (RFG), containing members 
from the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation, FAA, European 
Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment, Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics (RTCA), and participation from nations such as Australia, Canada and Japan 
[23].  The RFG is also working closely with the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) to ensure global interoperability for ADS-B.  ICAO codifies the principles and 
techniques of international air navigation and fosters the planning and development of 
international air transport to ensure safe and orderly growth.   
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 2.3.3 NextGen Components 
 NextGen is comprised of several components working simultaneously to collect 
information and disseminate it via a broadcast transmission [Figure 3].  Its main source of 
information is from the constellation of GPS satellites.  GPS sensors aboard an aircraft 
determine its location, which is then joined with information from the aircraft’s 
navigational system or Flight Management System (FMS).  The FMS provides 
information such as the flight plan to ensure the aircraft is following its designated path.   
 
 
 
Figure 3 - Major components of the ADS-B system [2] 
 
The FMS and GPS data is fused and broadcasted to other aircraft and ground stations.  
Both receiving aircraft and ground stations perform similar operations on the message to 
interpret and display the information on the control display unit (CDU) [2].   
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 2.3.4 ADS-B Explained 
 ADS-B’s main purpose is to determine the position of an aircraft and then 
broadcast that information, along with its altitude, call sign, heading, and aircraft type 
automatically (i.e., without an SSR interrogation signal) to other aircraft and to air traffic 
control ground facilities.  ADS-B is automatic in that it does not require any action or 
input by the pilot and there is no interrogation from the ground required.  It is also 
dependent because it relies on onboard equipment to gather the ADS-B data and 
broadcast it to other ADS-B users and it is a means of providing surveillance and traffic 
coordination.    
 ADS-B was created with compatibility and ease of transition in mind.  It was built 
using similar aspects of the current aircraft surveillance transmission mode called Mode S 
or mode select.  Mode S operates by interrogating aircraft by a specific aircraft 
identification number.  Only the aircraft possessing the correct identification number will 
reply to an interrogation with its flight information, eliminating issues with synchronous 
garbling.  Transmission types prior to Mode S include Modes A and C.  Mode A 
provided aircraft identification and Mode C provided altitude.  Mode S provides greater 
capabilities, primarily in the form of aircraft information to include identity, intent, 
capability and location [25].     
 ADS-B is similar to Mode S in that it uses the same transmission frequency of 
1090 MHz.  It differs in that the message is 112 bits, 120 µs long and are “squitter” 
messages [17] [26].  A squitter message is simply a transmitted message not invoked by 
any interrogation [Figure 4].  
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Figure 4 – Broadcasting of ADS-B squitter message [27] 
 
 As shown in Figure 5, 56 of the 112 bits are for ADS-B specific data to include 
altitude and airborne position (latitude and longitude).  The remaining bits are used for 
message format, aircraft address, parity check, and finally a few bits for the transponder 
communication capability.   
 
 
Figure 5 - Diagram showing the fields of the ADS-B message [2] 
 
 Pulse Position Modulation (PPM) is used for encoding and transmitting the 
message [26] [29].  The PPM for each pulse results in the data occupying either the first 
or second half of the entire pulse, which in effect is the same as Manchester encoding 
[Figure 6]. 
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Figure 6 - Manchester encoding 
 
 There are two types of equipment for ADS-B messages, with one being ADS-B In 
and the second being ADS-B Out.  ADS-B Out provides the ability to broadcast messages 
to ground stations and to other aircraft within the appropriate receiving range.  As 
demonstrated by the Los Angeles ADS-B trials, air-to-air reception ranged from 0 to 110 
nautical miles [30] [31] [32].  ADS-B In is responsible for receiving, decoding, and 
displaying messages within the cockpit or ATC tower.  As mentioned previously, by 
2020, all aircraft flying within the United States will be required to be equipped with 
ADS-B Out.  Currently there is no mandate for ADS-B In onboard aircraft, but without 
the usage of this equipment, many of the advantages of ADS-B cannot be utilized.   
2.4 Advantages of NextGen 
  One of the biggest advantages of ADS-B is the ability to provide coverage where 
radar could not reach before.  The primary area in which this is relevant is transoceanic 
navigation [33].  With current systems, the radar picture is limited by land based radar.  
ADS-B overcomes this limitation through the utilization of GPS satellites, broadcasts 
from other aircraft, and ground stations to generate its air picture.  Strategically placed 
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broadcast stations provide the ability to receive nearby transmissions and broadcast them 
out to anyone within range.  Therefore with careful placement of ATC facilities, aircraft 
will maintain the air picture around them, providing greater accuracy, resolution, integrity 
and safety. 
 Related to coverage, an added advantage is the smaller footprint of ADS-B 
facilities.  This allows the FAA to deploy ADS-B transmitters/receivers on structures 
such as oil rigs many miles out from land which can then act as Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance-Rebroadcast (ADS-R) stations [37] [Figure 7].  ADS-R receives ADS-B 
position broadcasts and rebroadcasts the information to near-by aircraft [34] [35].  In 
addition to a smaller footprint, operation and maintenance of ADS-B equipment and 
facilities will be significantly cheaper.  The average radar-based facility costs 
approximately $1-$4 million dollars while an ADS-B site will cost approximately $100-
$400 thousand [36]. 
 
 
Figure 7 - ADS-B equipment aboard an oil rig [37] 
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 Another advantage of ADS-B is more precise management of aircraft on their 
approach for landing.  As described by Randy Babbitt, the FAA Administrator, ADS-B 
provides “greater precision and reliability” [38].  Because the aircraft transmit location 
every second, data flows at nearly real-time, as compared to updates of five to ten 
seconds for traditional radar.  The controller can take advantage of this feature and are 
able to reduce the amount of space between each aircraft, thus increasing the airport’s 
throughput [39] [40].  A 2000 FAA study, demonstrated how aircraft could reduce their 
separation from the current standard of 4300 feet to only 750 feet [10].  This is a drastic 
change from the current methods which focus on aircraft flying a more rigidly structured 
and uniform flight path [41].  The ability to decrease separation allows aircraft to perform 
continuous descent landing, as opposed to the current stair-step practices [42].  In the 
stair-step method, aircraft alternately descend and then level off by accelerating engine 
speed.  These short bursts of engine speed burn enormous amounts of fuel, increase 
noise, and cause more emissions.  The elimination of the stair-step process could result in 
airlines saving millions of dollars in fuel costs.  The United Parcel Service used ADS-B 
for one year and realized a savings of 250,000 gallons of fuel.  The fuel savings generated 
additional benefits such as a 30% reduction in emissions and a 34% reduction in noise 
[43] [44].  
 Widespread usage of ADS-B also introduces the concept of Free Flight [45] to the 
NAS.  The Free Flight model could introduce further savings in fuel as well as faster 
flight times for passengers with the ability of aircraft pilots to formulate a more direct 
route from their point of origin to the aircraft’s destination. Aircraft routes would no 
longer be so rigidly structured and uniform or determined by ground controllers before 
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the flight takes place [41].  This is the result of more frequent reporting of the ADS-B 
surveillance system (reports every 1 second), ADS-B In technology, and the ability to 
receive precise aircraft position data in locations where PSR and SSR could never reach. 
 In addition to these positive results, Alaska’s Capstone program, an experiment in 
testing ADS-B technology and its effect on air traffic controller workload, produced even 
more optimistic results.  During the trial period, 208 aircraft were equipped with ADS-B.  
Normal flights in and out of the Alaskan region were monitored.  After program 
completion, surveys of controllers found that 57% said they had spent less time providing 
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) separation services, and 79% felt their overall efficiency 
increased with ADS-B.  Additionally, ATC saw a reduction of 18% in controller 
communications while at the same time reducing the fatal accident rate by nearly half 
[42] [46].  
 Providing a better air picture to the pilots is yet another advantage.  An aircraft 
with both ADS-B Out and ADS-B In can provide pilots with a more fluid response to 
situations since they have a clear picture of the air as well as the ground without relying 
on voice communications between themselves and air traffic controllers, as is the current 
case with radar-based systems.  This allows for faster response and corrective actions 
while providing the pilot with strong confidence in the air picture.   
 Finally, ADS-B has the potential to augment the Traffic Collision Avoidance 
System (TCAS) [47].  Although TCAS is not at the end of its life cycle, ADS-B operates 
in a similar fashion, giving the systems the capability to enhance their ability to avoid 
mid-air collisions.  TCAS works by interrogating aircraft (similar to SSR) within the 
vicinity and tracking aircraft by their replies to those interrogations.  TCAS then 
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determines if the aircraft has entered the ‘protection volume’ or safety zone of another 
aircraft.  If an aircraft has entered that zone, a traffic advisory is sent to the aircraft.  If the 
aircraft does not make the necessary correction a resolution advisory (vertical maneuver 
command) is released to avoid a mid-air collision [48].  Not only will ADS-B provide 
mid-air collision avoidance, but aircraft continue to transmit ADS-B messages while on 
the ground.  This provides surface surveillance for runway incursion avoidance and ramp 
management [49].  Although many advantages exist, like all new technologies, there also 
exist disadvantages or vulnerabilities.   
2.5 Vulnerabilities of ADS-B 
 ADS-B consists of GPS for an aircraft’s coordinates, a transponder, a barometric 
altimeter, and the associated wiring to connect them.  While each of these components 
offer potential avenues of attack, most are beyond the scope of this research and will not 
be discussed further.  The attacks to be focused on are those aimed at exploiting the 
ADS-B messages being transmitted and received by an aircraft.  Additional reading on 
GPS failures and information integrity can be found at [50] [51] [52].  Other sources [14] 
[52] outline ADS-B message attack scenarios in which the system could be exploited by 
nefarious users which will be described in the following paragraphs. 
    2.4.1 Passive Monitoring   
 In December of 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported that insurgents had 
purportedly intercepted live video feeds from unmanned aerial vehicles controlled by the 
United States military [1].  A related concern with ADS-B is the ability for any individual 
to purchase equipment that is capable of receiving and translating ADS-B messages 
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providing a mechanism to passively monitor aircraft for possible ill intent.  Dick Smith, 
former chairman of Australia’s Civil Aviation Administration, explained how terrorists 
with a laptop, transponder and antenna could intercept ADS-B messages and utilize them 
to track aircraft of law enforcement, high profile politicians, commercial aircraft, or 
military aircraft [53].   
 Additionally, with the advent of smart phone markets, applications have been 
released that will plot an ADS-B equipped aircraft on a map.  The user can download this 
application for free and monitor their local air traffic.  The paid version of this application 
provides additional information such as live aircraft movements, flight path contrails, the 
ability to search for an aircraft by flight number, aircraft altitude, speed, plane type, and 
transponder “squawk” codes.  This application costs a user only $3.99.  Applications of 
this sort are purely passive and only allow an individual to monitor without affecting an 
aircraft’s display or causing any harm to an ATC facility.  The next section discusses 
actions that will lead to the alteration of messages or the display aboard an aircraft or at 
an ATC facility.    
 2.4.2 Active Attacks 
 The first type of active attack on the ADS-B system is the ability for a malicious 
person to jam the signal at the ground station.  There will be approximately 800 ground 
stations placed 150 to 200 miles apart [19] [20].  Development of facilities for 
performing ADS-B communications have already begun and completion is projected for 
2013 [42].  Locating a ground station and gaining close proximity to it will likely not be 
difficult because they are numerous and their general locations have already been 
designated [Figure 8].   
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Figure 8 - Map showing ADS-B ground facility status [37]. 
 
 Related to this attack is jamming a specific aircraft.  Although an attacker could 
jam a single aircraft’s receiver from the ground, once the aircraft goes beyond line-of-
sight it will no longer be susceptible to the attack.   
 Another active attack vector is the injection of ghost targets on the display of 
aircraft as well as ground stations.  The user would need to transmit the 112 bit ADS-B 
message, which would then be received by the ground station and displayed for pilots and 
air traffic controller(s).   
 Spoofing aircraft on a ground station facility will not yield high success as the 
facilities will use primary surveillance radar to verify the ADS-B messages [28], however 
this verification cannot be implemented aboard an aircraft [54].  Because there is no 
current methodology allowing interoperability of ADS-B and legacy radar systems on an 
aircraft, what is shown on the display cannot be verified or corrected [55][56].  A 
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controller within an ATC facility also has the ability to reference logged flight plans to 
determine if a target is a ghost inject or not.  Again, the ability to perform this cross check 
is not available to pilots.  Suggestions have been made through prior research that signal 
tracking, ADS-B data filtering, evaluation directional characteristics of an ADS-B signal, 
track change reports, and flight intent, can provide information validation, eliminating the 
ghost inject scenario [57].  Because these validation techniques are not currently being 
employed they will not be discussed further.   
 Although it is out of the scope of this research, something of importance to note is 
the ADS-B system will use the backbone infrastructure of AT&T to connect the air traffic 
management picture.  This provides a vector through the Internet to infiltrate and/or 
disrupt the air traffic control system.  Access to the system could grant a malicious user 
the ability to disrupt, destroy, or deny ATC services.    
2.6 ADS-B Test Equipment 
 Many companies have begun production of light-weight and inexpensive 
hardware for both aerial enthusiasts and pilots alike to become familiar with the new 
ADS-B system.  One such piece of equipment, the SBS-1eR, is made by Kinetic Avionic 
Products Limited based out of the United Kingdom.  The SBS-1eR is about the size of 
the human hand and provides many features to include tracking of Mode-S/ADS-B 
equipped aircraft, built-in air traffic and FM radio, and software capable of being run on a 
laptop or PC with Windows operating system.  The software provides a virtual radar 
screen displaying any aircraft broadcasting ADS-B in the area.  Figure 9 is a screen 
capture of the virtual display generated by the software, showing a location within Ohio, 
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currently tracking two aircraft.   
 
 
Figure 9 - SBS-1eR virtual radar screen currently tracking two aircraft 
  
 Along with displaying the aircraft on the “radar screen”, additional information 
can be obtained for a given aircraft to include altitude, speed, exact location via GPS 
coordinates, country of origin, planned track, and aircraft identification in hexidecimal 
format [Figure 10].     
 
 
Figure 10 - Aircraft information displayed by SBS-1eR 
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 The SBS-1eR will be used throughout this research for monitoring live and ghost 
inject traffic.  This equipment will be used to validate the proof of concept system 
proposed by this thesis. 
2.7 Universal Software Radio Peripheral 
 The USRP is a flexible USB or Ethernet device capable of connecting to a laptop 
or PC [Figure 11].  The USRP provides a front end for software defined radio 
applications.  It is made up of a motherboard which contains four digital-to-analog 
converters, four analog-to-digital converters, a field programmable gate array (FPGA) 
discussed in the next section, and a USB or Ethernet controller [Figure 12].  Additionally, 
the USRP motherboard has the ability to support four daughterboards, two for receive 
and two for transmit.     
 
 
Figure 11- USRP N200 
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Figure 12 - USRP block diagram 
 
 Both the USRP and associated daughterboards are developed by Ettus Research, 
LLC.  The daughterboards vary greatly in their capability, with some performing receive 
actions and others performing both receive and transmit functions, also called 
transceivers.  The daughterboards allow a software defined radio application to operate at 
various frequencies depending on the specific board purchased [58]. 
2.8 FPGA/Digital Down Conversion 
 One of the main components of the USRP is a Xilinx FPGA.  The FPGA 
performs the process of digital down conversion (DDC).  This involves taking a band 
pass RF signal and mixing it to a lower frequency, which lowers the sample rate while 
retaining all information.  DDC is used when the signal of interest occupies a small 
portion of the entire bandwidth.  To illustrate the process, take a signal at the 45-47MHz 
range, the band of interest is only 2MHz.  The RF signal would be digitized at a sample 
rate of 100 million samples per second if it were not down converted.  This follows the 
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Nyquist theorem which states the sampling rate should be no less than two times the rate 
of the highest frequency [54].  DDC brings the signal of intent down to baseband, a signal 
measured from zero hertz to a cut-off frequency which would be 2 MHz for this example.  
At this point the baseband signal can be sampled at a much lower rate, on the order of 4-5 
MHz.  DDC adds the advantages of simplifying any further signal processing on the data, 
allows more processing to fit within the FPGA, and reduces the power requirement of the 
FPGA.   
2.9 GNU Radio Basics 
 GNU Radio is free software that provides a framework for developing software 
defined radio applications using readily-available, low-cost external RF hardware and 
commodity processors.  In addition, the recommended hardware for GNU Radio interface 
is the USRP.  
 GNU Radio uses the Python programming language for high-level organization, 
policy and GUI control, while using C++ for performance-critical signal processing 
blocks.  Different source files are released for free download on the GNU Radio wiki 
page.  Implementing the different software radios is as easy as downloading the source 
files and installing on a Linux based machine [59].   
 One such release was provided by Nick Foster, an employee of Ettus Research, 
who developed a simple Mode S/ADS-B receiver.  It was released in October of 2010 for 
download from the GNU Radio site.  It has the ability to decode and display ADS-B 
messages to the command window.  Once decoded, the output can be exported to 
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multiple interfaces to include keyhole markup language (KML) for Google Earth, which 
is a popular application for plotting data in three dimensional space.   
2.10 Summary 
 Using the information gained through this literature review an individual now has 
the general knowledge to begin the development of an ADS-B message generator as well 
as an ADS-B transmitter.  In the following chapter, the author will discuss the 
methodology in building such a system.    
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III. Methodology 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter will describe the methodology used in designing a system capable of 
both receiving and transmitting ADS-B messages.  The software, hardware, and coding 
will be discussed as well as the limitations experienced throughout the process of creating 
the system.  The system described will then be used to demonstrate that ADS-B messages 
can be spoofed causing ghost injects to be inserted and displayed on the commercial 
ADS-B receiver.   
3.2 Hardware and Software 
 3.2.1 Computer 
 The computer used during these experiments was a Dell® Precision 690 with 
Intel® Quad-Core Xeon processers operating at 3.00GHz.  The choice of this system was 
based on availability.  When designing a system similar to this, considerations should be 
made in the processing power of the computer used.  The processer operating at 3.00GHz 
will provide enough calculations per second to meet requirements for this system.  All 
modern processors should handle the calculations for digital signal processing as the 
majority of processing will occur within the USRP.  
 3.2.2 Operating System 
 The operating system chosen was Ubuntu 10.10, Maverick Meerkat, released in 
October of 2010.  Ubuntu is an open source operating system built around the Linux 
kernel.  Ubuntu 10.10 has proven to be an extremely stable version and much of the 
development for GNU Radio has taken place on this version, hence the decision to use it.  
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Ubuntu operating systems are freely available at ubuntu.com.  There are multiple ways to 
install the operating system, all of which are described at the Ubuntu website.   The 
install for these experiments were accomplished through disc boot.  It is assumed that the 
reader has a working knowledge of Ubuntu Linux and specific details for 
installing/configuring are not provided here.  The next step is deciding on a platform for 
building SDR applications.     
 3.2.3 SDR Design Platform 
 GNU radio was chosen for the experiments in this thesis.  It is written using two 
different programming languages.  The higher level language to create SDR applications 
is written in Python.  The lower level language which will perform the critical signal 
processing is C++.  This SDR toolkit was chosen for the following reasons.  GNU radio 
has a very large following and comes with pre-configured signal processing blocks for 
generating SDR programs, alleviating a significant portion of the learning curve required 
to transmit and receive radio frequency (RF) signals.  In addition to having pre-
configured processing blocks, the toolkit is completely free for use and experimentation.  
A final reason was the availability of previously developed code for receiving ADS-B 
messages using the standard GNU radio library [60].  This program, called GR-AIR-
MODES, provides insight into the decoding of ADS-B messages and helps to provide the 
foundation for creating, manipulating, and transmitting ADS-B messages and its 
associated data.   
 3.2.4 USRP 
 The USRP was chosen for its great flexibility and modular architecture.  The 
USRP family is developed and sold by Ettus Research, LLC.  This device provides the 
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front end for the SDR application, the two specific devices used are the USRP N200 and 
USRP2 [Figure 13].  The USRP2 was released in September of 2008.  The specifications 
of the USRP2 include a Xilinx Spartan 3-2000 FPGA, gigabit Ethernet interface, two 
100MS/s, 14 bit analog-to-digital converters (ADC), two 400 MS/s, 16-bit digital-to-
analog (DAC), and an SD card reader.  The USRP N200 is very similar to the USRP2 
with the only differences being the RF bandwidth increasing to 50 MHz from 25MHz and 
an onboard Flash memory instead of an SD card for firmware and configuration.  This 
allows for easier programming over the network.   
 
 
Figure 13 - System block diagram for testing/troubleshooting 
 
  3.2.4.1 USRP Daughterboards 
 With each USRP the appropriate daughterboard must be installed to provide the 
required RF coverage.  The daughterboards are also manufactured and sold by Ettus 
Research.  Since ADS-B messages are transmitted at the 1090MHz frequency the WBX 
daughterboard was chosen [Figure 14].  The specifics of the WBX daughterboard include 
a frequency range of 50 MHz to 2.2 GHz, transmission power of 30 to 100 mW, and dual 
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synthesizers for independent transmit and receive frequencies.  Both the USRP2 and 
USRP N200 will be using the WBX daughterboard.   
 
 
Figure 14 - WBX daughterboard 
 
  3.2.4.2 USRP Firmware 
 The USRPs were configured with the latest version of the Universal Hardware 
Driver (UHD) for better compatibility between the computer system and the USRP 
devices.  The UHD provides a single driver that can be used across all USRP devices.  
Prior to the integration of UHD, each USRP device had its own specific driver and the 
ability to communicate between USRPs was extremely difficult if not impossible [59].  
To use both UHD and GNU Radio a bash script is freely available at 
http://code.ettus.com/redmine/ettus/projects/uhd/wiki.  In order to install the latest UHD 
and GNU radio versions simply copy and paste the code to a shell file within the home 
directory.  Through the command line navigate to the location of the file and perform an 
execution command (./UHDandGNURadio.sh).  The script will download the most 
current software and complete all installation steps. 
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 3.2.5 Testing GNU Radio and USRP Install 
 To ensure proper installation of the above items, the UHD+GNURadio build 
provides some useful tools to include ‘uhd_find_devices’, which finds all properly 
configured URSPs and another application ‘uhd_usrp_probe’, which provides all 
specifications of those USRPs, to include firmware and daughterboard information.  
These applications can be found within the directory of the UHD+GNURadio installation 
within the /uhd/host/utils directory.  When running these scripts, be sure the devices are 
connected to a gigabit Ethernet port or they will not be recognized on the network and 
errors will result.  When networking USRPs, be sure to set the Internet Protocol (IP) 
address to 192.168.10.#.  Setting the IP address can be accomplished through another tool 
installed with UHD+GNURadio.  Appendix A contains information on the USRP device 
configuration settings and how to change them.   
3.3 Commercial ADS-B Receiver 
 In order to validate the information received, a commercial device was also 
purchased called the SBS-1eR.  The SBS-1eR, developed by Kinetic Avionic Products 
Limited, is a commercial device developed to receive and decode ADS-B messages.  The 
device also contains a built in very high frequency radio receiver for listening to air 
traffic communications.  It has an extremely small footprint and can connect to a PC or 
laptop via USB or Ethernet [Figure 15].  
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Figure 15 - Front and rear view of SBS-1eR 
 
 The SBS-1eR also includes Basestation Virtual Radar software, which provides a 
virtual radar screen on the PC for viewing aircraft movements [Figure 16].  The display 
will provide information such as aircraft ID, altitude, latitude, longitude, callsign, and 
much more within the right side of the display.  The aircraft’s position will be displayed 
on a virtual radar screen within the top left corner and finally the altitude in the bottom 
left corner.  
 
Figure 16 - SBS-1eR virtual radar screen currently tracking an aircraft 
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3.4 USRP ADS-B Receiver Install 
 There are two methods used within this research to receive ADS-B messages.  
The first is the SBS-1eR, which will display the aircraft on its software-based virtual 
radar screen.  The second method is to download, build, and run the GR-AIR-MODES 
program.  The subsequent paragraphs will go into the process of building the receiver and 
some detail on the options the program provides to the user. 
 Similar to the UHD and GNU Radio build script, the ADS-B receiver program is 
available for free and is easy to download through a git repository [60].  Github is a web-
based hosting service for software development projects.  Developers can store their code 
on the website and make changes as needed, which can then be downloaded by users of 
the application.  Using a simple command will download all the necessary files for 
building and running the program : 
 
git clone git://github.com/bistromath/GR-AIR-MODES.git 
 
 After completion, a GR-AIR-MODES folder is located in the current directory.  If 
any errors occur they will be displayed within the command prompt window.  All errors 
should be corrected before continuing.  In order to begin receiving data, a USRP must be 
functioning properly with the latest UHD version and a proper daughterboard, capable of 
receiving within the 1090MHz range.   
 After all hardware and software has been installed and compiled correctly, the 
program can be run by navigating to the GR-AIR-MODES folder and opening the 
src/python directory.  Simply executing the uhd_modes.py file will begin the capturing of 
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ADS-B/Mode-S messages.  There is no GUI, but messages will be displayed within the 
command prompt showing all relevant data fields [Figure 17].  If an error is received the 
USRP may have a different IP than the program expects.  Simply open uhd_modes.py in 
a text editor.  Line 63 of the code sets the IP of the USRP source, change it to the IP set 
during the steps followed in section 3.2.5.   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 17 - Command window displaying the GR-AIR-MODES program running 
 
 
 There is also a command line switch, -K, that will allow the user to ‘record’ all 
data captured to a KML file.  KML uses eXtensible Markup Language to encode 
geographic modeling data.  KML files can then be used within Google Earth.  After 
running the GR-AIR-MODES program with the –K option invoked, open Google Earth 
and import the KML file.  All aircraft broadcasting ADS-B messages will be displayed 
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on the three-dimensional map.  Although elementary, be sure to choose the correct 
antenna before running the program.  The antenna can be chosen through the –A 
command followed by the antenna name.  With the WBX daughterboard, there are two 
options, the receive (RX) only antenna or the transceiver (TX/RX).  There is no 
difference between the two antennas, but the USRP will default to RX.  If the antenna 
being used is not connected to RX, it may give the appearance the program is not 
receiving ADS-B messages.     
3.5 Demodulating the Pulse Train 
 As discussed in Chapter II, a typical ADS-B message is 120 µs long and uses 
PPM for transmitting the bits.  PPM is a form of signal modulation where the bits are 
transmitted in one of two possible time slots; for ADS-B the time slot equals one 
microsecond [Figure 18].  A “1” or “0” is denoted by a pulse in the first or second half 
(0.5 µs) of the time slot, respectively.     
 3.5.1 Preamble Detection 
 The first step in demodulating the pulse train is to determine the presence of a 
signal.  The first four pulses in Figure 18 are considered the preamble.   The preamble 
serves as a flag and time sync, notifying a receiver that a message will begin 8µs from the 
first preamble pulse.  The preamble does not follow conventional PPM principles (a pulse 
in every time slot).  A method for overcoming this deviation is to represent the gaps as 
consecutive “0” bits.   
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Figure 18 - 120 microsecond ADS-B message waveform 
 
 3.5.2 Message Reception 
 After the preamble has been detected, the individual bits need to be identified for 
message decoding.  The bits are detected through a threshold setting based on the pulse 
amplitudes of the preamble.  This requires the pulses to remain at relative constant 
amplitude throughout transmission.  Pulses violating the threshold could cause bit errors 
and ultimately the message would be discarded.  Once the bits have been received 
successfully, GR-AIR-MODES begins to decode the bits based upon the message type 
and the message format.  DF17 messages have a particular placement for the individual 
components of the message.  To ensure proper decoding, the format must be known to 
ensure the correct bits are used for altitude, aircraft ID, etc.  The ADS-B message is 
broken into six parts including the preamble [Figure 19].  
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Figure 19 - ADS-B message format. Modified from [2]. 
 
 
 
 The first field of the message is the DF type; as discussed ADS-B messages are 
set to 17 or 10001 binary.  The next field is the capability field or subtype field.  This 
field describes the specific data being transmitted by the ADS-B message.  The subtype 
message focused on for this research is subtype five, positional reports.  This field will be 
set to “101” for all tests.  Following the capability field is the aircraft’s ID, which is a 
three byte field that contains the ICAO designation for each aircraft.  The aircraft ID is 
assigned for the life of the aircraft but can be changed if necessary.  Following the 
aircraft ID are the 56 bits of ADS-B data, containing information about the altitude, 
latitude, and longitude of the aircraft.  Finally, the last field is the parity check, which is 
24 bits.  The parity bits are obtained using a cyclic redundancy check polynomial applied 
to the first 88 bits of the message.   
 3.5.3 Downlink Format and Aircraft ID Decoding 
 The first two fields can be converted to decimal format from its current binary 
format to determine the DF type and capability field.  Because the aircraft ID is in 
hexadecimal notation (6 hex characters) no decoding is necessary.  Decoding the altitude, 
latitude, and longitude requires multiple calculations and will be discussed next. 
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 3.5.4 Altitude Decoding 
 The altitude is comprised of 12 bits (bits 41-52).  In order to decode the altitude, 
bit number eight of the 12 bits, counting from left to right, is removed.  This is known as 
the Q bit.  This bit determines whether the altitude is being reported in 25 foot increments 
(set to ‘1’) or 100 foot increments (set to ‘0’) [Figure 20].  After determining the 
increment value, the first seven bits are shifted to the right, essentially eliminating the Q 
bit.  This will leave a binary number that can now be converted to decimal.  Once in 
decimal format, the number is multiplied by the increment (25 or 100), and the final step 
is to add 1,000 to it.   
 
Figure 20 - Q bit representation for altitude 
 
 For example, assume the altitude bit pattern is 000011111111.  Since the Q bit is 
set to one, the altitude is being reported in 25 foot increments.  The Q bit is then 
eliminated, which leaves 000001111111 or 127 decimal.  Next, the decimal number is 
multiplied by 25 for a product of 1,175.  Finally, 1,000 is added to give a decoded 
altitude of 2,175 feet.   
 3.5.5 Latitude and Longitude Decoding 
 The next decoding to take place is the latitude and longitude.  These two fields are 
each 17 bits.  There is an additional two bits designated for Compact Position Report 
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(CPR) format, which makes 36 bits total for this information.  CPR was developed for 
ADS-B messages to reduce the number of bits required to transmit positional data.  
Accuracy for ADS-B messages is within 5.1 meters, since the Earth’s circumference is 
around 40,000 kilometers that would require almost 7.8 million position values 
(40,000m/5.1m) or 23 bits of data (2^23 = 8,388,608).  In order to fit the positional data 
into 17 bits, the higher order bits are eliminated.  The higher order bits contain 
information such as the hemisphere in which the aircraft is located.  Since an aircraft in 
most cases will remain within the same hemisphere for the lifetime of the aircraft, they 
can be eliminated.  In order to accomplish this without causing ambiguity, the Earth is 
divided into odd and even latitude and longitude zones [Figure 21].  In order to determine 
the precise location, both odd and even CPR messages must be received.  These two 
formats differ slightly in their calculations, but will be used to narrow down the location 
of the aircraft to an X and Y coordinate within one zone to within the 5.1 meter accuracy 
mentioned earlier. 
 
 
Figure 21 – Latitude (left) and longitude (right) zone boundaries [6] 
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 The equations throughout the decoding process were found at [61].  The first step 
in decoding is to calculate the latitude index designated by the letter j as shown in 
Equation 1.  Lat(0) and Lat(1) are the odd and even format messages received.   
 
     
                    
      
  
 
 
     ( 1 )             
             
Following that the recovered latitude (Rlat) is calculated.  This calculation is performed 
for both the odd and even messages [Equation 2].  For this equation, the zone size is 
designated by the variable Dlati.  Dlat1 and Dlat0 differ slightly with an odd message 
equal to 360/4*(Number Of Zones-1) and an even message equal to 360/4*(Number of 
Zones).  The number of zones equals 15 as this is the amount of zones within each 
quadrant of the Earth.  The modulus function within this equation returns the remainder 
of dividing the first variable by the second variable.   
 
                               
      
      
  ( 2 ) 
 
  
 The next variable to determine is the number of longitude zones (NL).  This is 
determined by using the rlat value from the previous equation.  A lookup table 
[Appendix C] is used to determine the NL(rlat) value.  Next is the width of the longitude 
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zone (ni) which is calculated by dividing 360 by NL – i.  Further decoding leads us to the 
longitude index [Equation 3]. 
 
                 
                                   
      
 ( 3 ) 
 
Finally, the longitude of the second message received (the odd message) is found using 
[Equation 4]. 
 
 
                    
                                    
      
                   ( 4 ) 
  
 
 The final field to decode is the parity check.  The parity bits are calculated 
through a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) with a generating polynomial and using the 
first 88 bits of the ADS-B message [Equation 5].   It is assumed the user has general 
knowledge of how CRC bits are generated and will not be covered in great detail.  
Information for generating CRC bits can be found at [62].  
 
 
                                                  
                        
( 5 ) 
 The preceding discussion focused on decoding the ADS-B message bits.  
Encoding an ADS-B message is essentially the reverse.     
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3.6 USRP and ADS-B Transmission 
 Just as in receiving, the transmission of ADS-B signals will require the correct 
hardware to transmit the messages at 1Mb/second at the carrier frequency of 1090MHz.  
For this setup, all equipment previously described was used.  The use of the GNU radio 
companion (GRC) was used in the creation of the transmitter.  GRC is a GUI application 
installed with the UHD+GNURadio script.  To run GRC the command gnuradio-
companion should be executed.  Within the GRC are pre-built blocks that allow 
construction of SDR applications in a drag-and-drop fashion.  The flow of information is 
then created by connecting each block’s output to another block’s input.  The beginning 
block is called the source and the flow of information will end with a sink.  When a GRC 
application is executed, Python scripts that control the USRP radios are automatically 
generated.   
 Figure 22 shows a GRC representation for the ADS-B Transmitter.  A file source 
is used to provide the binary representation of the ADS-B message.  This message has 
been properly encoded with all ADS-B message components as discussed in section 3.5, 
Figure 19.  It has also been generated using proper PPM coding.  Next is the packed-to-
unpacked block, which extracts message bits from the file one bit at a time and prepares 
it for transmission.  As the name states, this block receives packed data (hexadecimal 
format) and unpacks it into its binary format.  For example, a hexadecimal “A” received 
from the file will be unpacked to “1010”.  A “1” read from the binary file will result in a 
pulse with amplitude of one, a “0” will result in no pulse.  
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Figure 22 - GNU Radio Companion screenshot containing the ADS-B Transmitter 
application 
 
 The char-to-float block converts the binary bits to a floating point representation, 
which allows manipulation of the data using floating point numbers.  For this case, the 
amplitude of one is multiplied by 0.3, decreasing the amplitude of the pulse from a height 
of 1 to 0.3.  This is performed because the USRP cannot handle amplitude of 1 without 
causing pulses to overlap (smear), which would result in errors in our message. 
 There are two sinks for this GRC program.  The scope sink is included to aid in 
troubleshooting issues with the signal and does not affect the application.  The second 
sink is the USRP.  Before the signal flows to the USRP, it goes through a float-to-
complex block, this converts floating point data to complex data for upconversion to RF 
(1090 MHz).   
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 The parameters of the USRP include the IP address of the USRP, sample rate, 
transmission gain, and antenna choice.  The sample rate should be set to 2Ms/s in order to 
satisfy Nyquist’s Theorem, described earlier.  The transmission gain was set to default at 
four, best results when running the program were found between a gain of one and four.  
Finally, the antenna used throughout the research was the transceiver (TX/RX).   
  Another SDR application was designed within GRC to assist in troubleshooting 
any issues with the transmission of ADS-B messages [Figure 23].  The blocks involved 
with this application are a USRP source, a complex-to-magnitude block, and a scope sink.  
The USRP is tuned to the 1090MHz frequency and uses the complex-to-magnitude block 
to perform amplitude demodulation on the received signal, which is then fed into a scope 
sink for a visual look of the received message.       
 
 
Figure 23 - GRC view of the ADS-B troubleshooting application 
 
 
Using two USRPs connected by a 30 dB attenuator, a message was transmitted and 
received [Figure 13].  The results of that transmission were observed with the scope 
sinks.  These two scope plots show the message before transmission [Figure 24] and the 
message upon receiving it with the other USRP [Figure 25].  
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Figure 24 - Scope plot of transmitted message 
 
Figure 25 - Scope plot of received message 
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3.7 ADS-B Message Generation 
 The preceding sections have created the foundation for generating and 
transmitting ADS-B messages.  This section discusses the calculations necessary to create 
the data file containing the encoded aircraft ID, altitude, positional data, and CRC bits.  
Appendix B contains a C++ program that accepts data input and generates a properly 
encoded ADS-B message.             
 Encoding an ADS-B message requires four inputs: aircraft ID, altitude, latitude 
and longitude.  The aircraft ID will be entered as hexadecimal characters (0-9 & A-F).  
The altitude will be an integer divisible by 25, as all altitude will be encoded in 25ft 
increments for greater precision (compared to 100ft increments).  Finally, the latitude and 
longitude inputs represented by degrees, minutes, and seconds (DDDMMSS) will be 
entered in decimal format.  The DDDMMSS information is converted to decimal degrees 
for latitude and longitude using the following formula:   
 
                        
       
  
 
       
    
                  ( 6 ) 
 
 
 After converting latitude and longitude into decimal numbers, it must be 
determined if they will be negative or positive.  Using Figure 26, locations north of the 
equator will yield positive latitudes while locations south of the equator will be negative.  
Finally, locations east of the prime meridian will result in negative longitudes and vice 
versa for locations west of the prime meridian.  
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Figure 26 - Latitude and Longitude Measurements 
  
 3.7.1 DF Type 
 To construct the message as shown in Figure 19, the first step is to append the DF 
format type.  This value, 0x8D or 10001101, is added to the message automatically by the 
C++ program.  The first five bits (10001) equates to 17 decimal or the desired DF format 
type.  The last three bits are a capability field referring to the specific data being 
transmitted, throughout this research this field will refer to positional data reports 
(subtype five).   
 3.7.2 Aircraft ID Generation 
 The next data to be entered is the aircraft ID.  This is represented by six hex 
characters or three bytes of data.  Since this information is entered as hexadecimal 
characters it does not need to be manipulated.  It can be appended directed to the DF type 
and stored within the message array. 
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 3.7.3 Altitude Encoding 
 Following the aircraft ID generation is the altitude calculations.  This data is 
entered as a decimal number.  To encode it requires subtracting 1,000 and then dividing 
the number by 25.  As discussed earlier, room must be made for the Q bit.  The values in 
the last four bits are held in memory.  Following that, the first eight bits are shifted to the 
left by one.  An OR is then performed to concatenate the shifted bits and the last four bits.  
To complete the encoding, the Q bit set to 1 (25 ft increments), is added in the eighth bit 
position.  Similar to the aircraft ID, hexadecimal 0x58 is then appended to the front of the 
altitude to denote a type code of 11 (01011000), which equates to an airborne position 
report.  The three zeros in the remaining in this field provide surveillance status within 
the first two bits and the antennas used in the last bit.  These three bits are irrelevant to 
this research and will be set to “000” for all tests.  The value for altitude is then stored 
within the message array.   
 3.7.4 Latitude and Longitude Encoding 
  The next two data inputs are the latitude and longitude.  These require many 
more calculations but follow similar procedures as the decoding section.  The first step is 
to determine Dlati, the latitude zone size [Equation 7].  These numbers will remain 
constant throughout the life of the program.  NZ is the number of zones per quadrant 
which will be 15 at all times.  The variable i refers to the format type (1 odd or 0 even).       
 
        
   
      
   ( 7 ) 
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 After determining the Dlat values, the next calculation is the YZ value or Y 
coordinate within the Zone.  This is calculated using the Dlat value and the latitude value 
input by the user [Equation 8].  The result of this equation will give an integer within the 
17 bit limit.  Floor(x) is defined as the greatest integer k such that k ≤ x.  For example, 
floor(5.6) will be equal to 5, while the floor(-5.6) equals -6.  This integer is then assigned 
to a variable for later use.         
 
                       
    
                 
     
  
 
 
   ( 8 ) 
    
 Realized latitude is then calculated.  This value will be approximately the same 
value as that entered by the user.  The latitude, YZ and Dlat values are all used for this 
calculation as shown in Equation 9.  The realized latitude or Rlat value, calculated during 
this step is then used to determine the specific longitude zone or NL.  NL is set via a look 
up table as described earlier.     
 
               
  
   
         
        
     
   ( 9 ) 
 
Using the NL value returned by the lookup table [Appendix C], the longitude zone size 
(Dlon) can then be determined with the simple equation [Equation 10]. 
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 ( 10 ) 
 
 Finally, the encoded longitude value is calculated.  This is known as the XZ value 
or X coordinate within the Zone:   
 
            
     
                       
    
  
 
 
   ( 11 ) 
  
 After both numbers have been generated (YZ and XZ), they are concatenated onto 
each other.  It should be noted that these numbers are not added together.  The YZ value is 
shifted to the left 17 positions and then OR’d with the XZ value.  This 34 bit value is now 
ready for transmission as an even message.  In order to transmit as an odd message the bit 
in position #35 (“F” bit from Figure 19) must be set to “1”.  This value is then added to 
the message array in preparation for the final calculations before being written to a binary 
file. 
 3.7.5 CRC Bit Generation 
 The final step of encoding is to apply the CRC polynomial to compute the parity 
bits.  The code for generating CRC bits has some preliminary bit manipulation before 
beginning the XORing.  The first seven lines of code within the 
CalculateCRC112BitsOdd function ensure 4 bytes of data are in each of the variables to 
be XOR’d. Once this takes place, the individual portions of the message begin a loop that 
iterates until all 88 bits have gone through.  The result of XORing the 88 bits with a 25 
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bit polynomial will result in a remainder of 24 bits.  These bits are stored within the 
message array, which can now be written to a binary file.  The file will be called 
FinalMessage.bin, located in the same directory as the DF17MessageGenerator.  The 
user can then set this file to be the source of the ADS-B Transmitter [Figure 22].   
 3.7.6 Transmitting the Messages 
 Once the file is set as the source, there are two options for running the ADS-B 
transmitter.  Those options are to run it from the GRC application or run it via command 
line.  After execution begins, the scope plots for the ADS-B Transmitter as well as the 
ADS-B message analyzer (discussed earlier), will prove useful.   
3.8 Summary 
 This chapter presented the development of a system comprised of a computer, 
USRP, and C++ code for generating acceptable ADS-B messages.  Additionally, it 
discussed the process of decoding and encoding ADS-B messages for transmission.  The 
next chapter discusses the validation of the system and covers some applications of how 
the system can be used to generate and inject false messages.   
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IV. Analysis and Results 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter will discuss the techniques used to validate the system developed in 
Chapter III.  The first section will discuss the GR-AIR-MODES validation process.  
Following that will be the validation of the contributions of this research, the 
DF17MessageGenerator and the ADS-B Transmitter.  Finally, demonstrations will be 
conducted and analyzed to display the potential capabilities of the system.     
4.2 Validation of ADS-B Systems 
 It is reasonable to question the validity of GR-AIR-MODES and the ADS-B 
Transmitter created with the USRPs.  GR-AIR-MODES depends on the code developed in 
[60] while the ADS-B transmitter application is dependent on the code developed in this 
research.  The SBS-1eR commercial receiver was used to validate the operation of both 
GR-AIR-MODES and the ADS-B Transmitter.  After validating the GR-AIR-MODES 
program it was used to validate the DF17MessageGenerator.   
 4.2.1 GR-AIR-MODES Validation 
 In order to validate the GR-AIR-MODES program, it was run side-by-side with the 
SBS-1eR multiple times.  The intention of these experiments was to compare the data 
captured by both receivers.  Should the commercial device and GR-AIR-MODES program 
capture similar data, it is assumed GR-AIR-MODES performs accurately.   
 During the side-by-side experiments, GR-AIR-MODES was run with the –K 
option invoked to store all ADS-B data within KML files for viewing within Google 
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Earth.  This option was used to replicate the virtual radar screen generated by the SBS-
1eR software.  Throughout all experiments, the devices captured the exact same 
information.  The results of one of the experiments conducted are shown in Figure 27.  
During this experiment, there was one aircraft broadcasting ADS-B data.  This data was 
captured by both the SBS-1eR and GR-AIR-MODES.   
 
 
Figure 27 - Side-by-side view of SBS-1eR (left) and GR-AIR-MODES (right)  
 
 Additional data captured during this particular experiment included altitude, 
speed, and heading [Figure 28] [Figure 29].  Both devices were able to capture and 
decode precisely the same information with a heading of approximately 94°, a speed of 
575 knots (~661 mph), an altitude of 37,000ft and a location of latitude 35.854721 and 
longitude -84.266113.  A slight difference in longitude and altitude, shown within the 
figures below, is a result of the delay in capturing a screen shot for both programs (i.e., 
the aircraft kept broadcasting data so GR-AIR-MODES received one additional message 
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with updated information).   
         
 
Figure 28 - SBS-1eR captured data 
 
 
Figure 29 - GR-AIR-MODES captured data 
 
 4.2.2 DF17MessageGenerator Validation 
 GR-AIR-MODES can then be used to validate the DF17MessageGenerator.  For 
the purpose of validation, the –w command was used during GR-AIR-MODES execution.  
This command will display the ADS-B message in its hexadecimal format in the 
command prompt window [Figure 30].  The aircraft information, to include aircraft ID, 
altitude, and position, were then used as input for the DF17MessageGenerator.  The 
message displayed by GR-AIR-MODES was then compared to the message generated by 
the DF17MessageGenerator.  The DF17MessageGenerator produced the exact same 
results [Figure 31].    
  
 
Figure 30 - Raw data displayed by GR-AIR-MODES 
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Figure 31 - DF17MessageGenerator validation message 
 
 4.2.3 ADS-B Transmitter Validation 
 The final step is to validate the ADS-B Transmitter.  To perform this validation, 
the USRP N200 ran the ADS-B Transmitter with a file source containing the message 
from the previous validation (Aircraft ID AB7437, altitude 36025, latitude 39.925827 and 
longitude -84.193542).  The USRP N200 then transmitted the message, which was 
received successfully by the SBS-1eR [Figure 32].  The results showed the successful 
reception and display of the ADS-B message [Figure 33].  The bottom left corner of the 
figure displays the altitude, the top left corner shows the virtual radar display with the 
aircraft plotted in the correct position, and the right side of the figure displays the 
aircraft’s information to include the latitude and longitude points.   
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Figure 32 - System block diagram for implementation/use 
 
 
 
Figure 33 - ADS-B Transmitter Validation 
 
4.3 Demonstrating the DF17MessageGenerator and ADS-B Transmitter  
 After completing the validation of the systems, four demonstrations were 
performed to exhibit the system’s potential.  All experiments were conducted using the 
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DF17MessageGenerator and the ADS-B Transmitter.  The first demonstration was to plot 
multiple aircraft on the radar display of both GR-AIR-MODES and the SBS-1eR.  Next, 
live data received by the SBS-1eR was observed, altered, and rebroadcast.  The third 
demonstration plotted false aircraft following a live aircraft.  Finally, an aircraft track was 
generated, which involves having a false target “move” through the airspace. 
 4.3.1 Flooding Radar Display 
 The first scenario tested was flooding the radar screen with false targets.  To 
demonstrate this scenario, 10 aircraft messages were generated using the 
DF17MessageGenerator and then transmitted using the USRP/ADS-B Transmitter.  Both 
GR-AIR-MODES and SBS-1eR were used to receive and plot the aircraft with varying 
locations and altitudes, as shown in Figure 34 and Figure 35.  This technique could be 
implemented using as few or as many aircraft as desired to cause confusion within the 
airspace and in ground facilities.   
 
 
Figure 34 - Google Earth view of multi-aircraft scenario 
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Figure 35 – SBS-1eR software view of multi-aircraft scenario 
  
 4.3.2 Altering Live Data 
 The next scenario requires the reception of live data, altering the information such 
as the altitude or location, and broadcasting the new spoofed message.  This scenario 
could be used to “change” the position of an aircraft and cause confusion within the 
cockpit of an aircraft or at an ATC ground facility.     
 To demonstrate this scenario, live data was captured using the SBS-1eR.  Once an 
aircraft broadcasting ADS-B messages appeared on the radar screen, its data was entered 
into the DF17MessageGenerator [Figure 36] with a different altitude and position.    
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Figure 36 – Entering altered data for live data scenario 
 
 Using the ADS-B Transmitter, the spoofed message was then broadcast.  After a 
few seconds, the SBS-1eR shows a change in data for the aircraft with aircraft ID 
A794E1.  First, a change in altitude (from 33,000 ft to 10,000 ft) is observed and then the 
position changes to the spoofed position coordinates.  The lag in positional change is due 
to the calculations involved in converting the odd and even messages to an exact X and Y 
coordinate within the latitude and longitude zones.  Once the position has been 
determined, the aircraft seems to jump from its current location (a) to the false position 
(b).  The position can be viewed in the top portion of the figure and the altitude can be 
observed within the bottom section.  After turning the ADS-B transmitter off, the 
aircraft’s true position and altitude return [Figure 37].  In (c), the aircraft is highlighted 
blue as the receiver interprets the change in altitude (from 10,000 ft to 33,000 ft), as the 
aircraft ascending.  Of note, the figure gives the impression that the true aircraft position 
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vanishes.  This is due to the close proximity of the ADS-B Transmitter to the SBS-1eR, 
causing the commercial receiver to be flooded with the spoofed message, which is 
transmitted repeatedly.  In reality, both the real aircraft and spoofed aircraft would appear 
on the display of an aircraft or ATC ground facility.   
 
             
         (a)    (b)    (c) 
Figure 37 - Series of SBS-1eR screen captures (a) shows original aircraft data, (b) shows 
aircraft data of spoofed messages, and (c) shows aircraft returning to original location 
  
 4.3.3 False Aircraft Following 
 The third demonstration also awaited the reception of live aircraft data using the 
SBS-1eR.  Once an aircraft was displayed, two ADS-B messages were generated with 
aircraft IDs of BAD001 and BAD002.  Both false messages had coordinates trailing the 
aircraft by approximately 15-20 nautical miles.  This demonstrates the ability to inject 
false aircraft in the vicinity of real aircraft in an expedient manner.  If the locations of the 
false aircraft were closer to the target it may cause confusion for the pilots, which could 
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lead to unnecessary corrections to avoid a mid-air collision.   
 
 
   (a)      (b) 
Figure 38 - Radar display for aircraft following scenario (a) shows the live aircraft and 
(b) shows the two spoofed aircraft trailing 
 
 4.3.4 Aircraft Track Generation 
 The final demonstration to be discussed is the production of an aircraft track.  
This involves having a false target “move” through the airspace by changing the position 
values in the ADS-B messages that are transmitted on a regular basis.  This 
demonstration generated movement for one aircraft, however multiple false tracks could 
also be generated.  This can also be applied to any of the previous demonstrations.   
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 To execute this scenario, a message must be generated to establish the point of 
origin of the false aircraft.  Subsequent messages should then follow within 1-10 seconds 
of each other using appropriate latitude and longitude points for movement in any 
direction [Figure 39].  The scenario produced an aircraft with Aircraft ID D3D3D3 
moving in an eastward direction.  The dots on the figure represent the reception of 
individual ADS-B messages.  An update was sent once every second giving the 
impression the aircraft traveled over 50 nautical miles.   
 
 
Figure 39 – SBS-1eR radar picture of false aircraft track 
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4.4 Summary 
 The demonstrations within this chapter emphasize the potential of the 
DF17MessageGenerator and ADS-B Transmitter to generate false/deceptive ADS-B 
messages.  With a limited amount of time, it was not feasible to construct more 
demonstrations, however the work provided here creates a strong foundation for the 
capabilities of the system developed in this thesis.  It is assumed by the amount of 
success already achieved that the uses of the system are only limited by the imagination.    
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter reviews the work completed and offers conclusions on the 
information discovered through the experiments.  The investigative questions from 
Chapter I will be reviewed first, then discussions on further research related to this topic, 
and finally a summary.   
5.2 Conclusions of Research 
 The purpose of this research was to investigate the weaknesses of the NextGen 
system to include the ability to inject false targets on the display of a commercial 
receiver.  Additionally, this work investigated the ability to develop a proof of concept 
system using relatively inexpensive equipment.  The author concludes that this research 
successfully developed a system capable of generating ADS-B messages and transmitting 
them in accordance with ADS-B message protocol.  Furthermore, the messages 
transmitted were successfully received and displayed by a commercial ADS-B receiver, 
the SBS-1eR.   
5.3 Investigative Questions Answered 
 The research and methodology described in the previous chapters revealed the 
steps required to encode raw data and transform it into a properly formatted ADS-B 
transmission.  The majority of the information for encoding could be found within RTCA 
DO 260 Minimum Operational Performance Standards for 1090 MHz Extended Squitter 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast which is purchasable for approximately 
$150.00.  The reason the author did not purchase and use this document was to illustrate 
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the ease in which an individual could find the necessary information as well as maintain 
anonymity.    
 The accomplishments of this thesis showed that with some knowledge of digital 
signal processing (DSP) and the ability to write code in Python and C++, it is possible to 
develop a system capable of generating acceptable ADS-B messages.  “Acceptable” 
means good enough to be recognized by commercial off-the-shelf equipment that are 
used to decode ADS-B broadcasts.  The messages ranged from single aircraft to multi-
aircraft broadcasting.  Additionally, the messages were used to generate aircraft tracks to 
imitate the travel of an aircraft across the radar screen of a receiving station.     
 The creation of the system took approximately six months for an individual with 
little to no background in DSP and RF communications.  The system developed was 
composed of two USRPs with appropriate RF daughterboards and antennas, a Dell 
personal computer, and freely available software.  In reality, once the system is built, two 
USRPs are not necessary.  Excluding the second device and its associated daughterboard, 
the cost for creating this system was less than $5,000.00, with the USRP costing 
$1700.00, an antenna $35.00, WBX daughterboard $450.00, and the Dell Precision 690 
costing approximately $2,000.00.  The software for DSP applications along with the 
operating system came at no cost as they are freely available for download and use.  
 Finally, the potential capability of the system was also shown through the use of 
the system in four demonstrations.  Those scenarios exhibited the use of the system in 
generating multiple false targets, altering live data being received, inserting false targets 
near real aircraft and lastly, creating an aircraft track.     
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5.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
 Although the system developed in this thesis has the ability to generate ADS-B 
messages, it currently can only create one message at a time.  Future research should 
include generating multiple messages in a dynamic manner.  The code, as currently 
written, will stack one message on top of another within the same file.  This can be 
successful for most scenarios, to include all those discussed within chapter four.  Future 
work could also include the development of separate functions to perform certain tasks 
such as generating a complete track with only a starting (both latitude and longitude) and 
end point.   
 In relation to work with generating a complete track, work with the ‘great circle’ 
calculations could prove to be useful in generating tracks for aircraft and the associated 
latitude and longitude points along a given track.  The great circle premise states that for 
any two points on the surface of a sphere, there exists a circle that goes through both of 
those points.  With further research into these calculations, it could then be incorporated 
into the current code for expedited long track message generation.      
 The system proved to work well within the experimental environment.  However, 
it was not tested on real systems within an aircraft or at an ADS-B ground station.  The 
low power of the USRP makes it ideal for the environment in which this thesis took place 
and prevents the transmissions from causing any interference or reception by aircraft 
equipped with ADS-B In.  This is a limiting factor in that the system could not be tested 
aboard aircraft to determine if the messages displayed upon the SBS-1eR would also 
show on the displays of a cockpit.  Further real-world testing is therefore needed.   
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 Additional research could be performed in the use of ADS-B subtype 9 messages.  
This provides aircraft speed and track information.  When broadcasting spoofed messages 
throughout this research, it can be observed that the speed and track information located 
below the aircraft displayed on the SBS-1eR shows zeros.  Having the ability to add this 
information to the current system would increase the appearance of an authentic aircraft 
broadcasting ADS-B data.   
 Finally, future research could be conducted with the non-commercial ADS-B data 
link, UAT or 978 MHz.  Experiments could be conducted to test if the current system 
would have the ability to generate false targets using this link.  
5.5 Summary 
  The system produced through this research was comprised of the following 
components, GNU Radio for the software defined radio application, a USRP front end, 
and the development of a C++ program to properly encode messages.  Through the 
validation techniques described in Chapter IV the system proved it has the ability to 
generate and transmit acceptable ADS-B messages.  Moreover, the use of a commercial 
receiver was used to provide validation of receiving and displaying these false ADS-B 
messages.   
 The tools created through this research, the DF17MessageGenerator and the 
ADS-B Transmitter, have proved the hypothesis proposed by McCallie, et al [2] of 
spoofing ADS-B messages.  These tools further show the weaknesses of the NextGen 
system.  In conclusion, future research could identify further uses for this system.   
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Appendix A 
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Appendix B 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
//Code developed to generate ADS-B messages////////////// 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
#include <iostream> 
#include <fstream> 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include <math.h> 
#include <string> 
#include <iomanip> 
 
using namespace std; 
 
long int completeMessageOdd[5]; 
long int completeMessageEven[5]; 
int Dlat0 = 6;              //even messages 
double Dlat1 = 6.101694915254237288135593220339;  //odd messages 
double pi = 3.14159265; 
char buffer[30] = {0xA1, 0x40}; 
 
double Modulus(double val, double modval) 
{ 
  
 if (val < 0) //Checking for negative angles 
 { 
  val = val + 360; 
  int result = floor(static_cast<int>( val / modval)); 
  return val - static_cast<double>( result ) * modval;   
 } 
  else  
  { 
   int result = static_cast<int>( val / modval); 
   return val - static_cast<double>( result ) * modval; 
  } 
} 
 
int GenerateNlatValue(double latitude) 
{ 
 double Nlat; 
 double sqrtHold;  
 double buff[63]; 
 int j = 2; 
 for (int i = 2; i <=59; i++) 
 { 
 Nlat = 0.0; 
 sqrtHold = 0.0; 
 Nlat = (180/pi)*(acos(sqrt((1-(cos(pi/30)))/(1- 
 (cos((2*pi)/i)))))); 
 buff[j] = Nlat; 
 j++; 
 } 
 
71 
 for (int k = 59; k >=2; k--) 
 { 
  if(latitude > buff[k]) 
  { 
    
  }    
  else 
  { 
   if (k < 2) 
   { 
    return 1; 
   } 
   return k;  
  }  
 }  
} 
 
 
 
int CalculateLatBitsOdd(double lat, double longitude) 
{  
 
 //Calculate YZ which will be what is put into our message 
 double YZ; 
 double modHold; 
 int LatHex; 
 modHold = Modulus(lat, Dlat1); 
 modHold = (modHold/Dlat1); 
 modHold = modHold * pow(2,17); 
 modHold = modHold + .5; 
 YZ = floor(modHold); 
  
 //Calculate Rlatiude for airborne 
 long double Rlat1; 
 int floorHold; 
 Rlat1 = (double)YZ / pow(2,17); 
 floorHold = (lat/(double)Dlat1); 
 floorHold = floor(floorHold); 
 Rlat1 = Rlat1 + (double)floorHold; 
 Rlat1 = Rlat1 * Dlat1; 
 int NlLat = GenerateNlatValue(Rlat1); 
 
 //Calcule DLongitude 
 double Dlon1; 
 if ((NlLat - 1) > 0) 
 { 
  Dlon1 = (360/((double)NlLat-1)); 
 } 
 else  
  Dlon1 = 360; 
 
 //Calculate XZ the decimal representation of our longitude 
 double XZ; 
 modHold = 0; 
 modHold = Modulus(longitude, Dlon1); 
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 modHold = (modHold/Dlon1); 
 modHold = modHold * pow(2,17); 
 modHold = modHold + .5; 
 XZ = floor(modHold); 
 
 //Ensure this fits into our 17 bit space 
 long int YZ1 = Modulus(YZ,pow(2,17)); 
 long int XZ1 = Modulus(XZ,pow(2,17)); 
 long int LatLon; 
 YZ1 = YZ1 << 17; 
 LatLon = (YZ1 | XZ1); 
 LatLon = (LatLon | 17179869184); 
 completeMessageOdd[2] = LatLon; 
return 0;    
} 
 
int CalculateLatBitsEven() 
{ 
 double lat; 
 double longitude; 
 cout << "Please enter your requested Latitude: \n"; 
 cin >> setbase(10) >> lat; 
 cout << "Please enter your requested Longitude: \n"; 
 cin >> setbase(10) >> longitude; 
 CalculateLatBitsOdd(lat, longitude); 
  
 //Calculate YZ which will be what is put into our message 
 double YZ; 
 double modHold; 
 int LatHex; 
 modHold = Modulus(lat, Dlat0); 
 modHold = (modHold/Dlat0); 
 modHold = modHold * pow(2,17); 
 modHold = modHold + .5; 
 YZ = floor(modHold); 
   
 //Calculate Rlatiude for airborne 
 long double Rlat0; 
 int floorHold; 
 Rlat0 = (double)YZ / pow(2,17); 
 floorHold = floor(lat/(double)Dlat0); 
 Rlat0 = (double)Rlat0 + floorHold; 
 Rlat0 = Rlat0 * (double)Dlat0; 
 int NlLat = GenerateNlatValue(Rlat0); 
 
 //Calcule DLongitude 
 double Dlon0; 
 if ((NlLat - 1) > 0) 
 { 
  Dlon0 = (360/((double)NlLat)); 
 } 
 else 
 { 
  Dlon0 = 360; 
 } 
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 //Calculate XZ the decimal representation 
 //of our longitude 
 double XZ; 
 modHold = Modulus(longitude, Dlon0); 
 modHold = (modHold/Dlon0); 
 modHold = modHold * pow(2,17); 
 modHold = modHold + .5; 
 XZ = floor(modHold); 
  
 //ensure they will fit into a 17 bit message 
 long int YZ1 = Modulus(YZ,pow(2,17)); 
 long int XZ1 = Modulus(XZ,pow(2,17)); 
 long int LatLon; 
 YZ1 = YZ1 << 17; 
 LatLon = (YZ1 | XZ1); 
 completeMessageEven[2] = LatLon; 
 
return 0;   
} 
 
long int CalculateAltitude() 
{ 
 long int altitude; 
 long int hold; 
 cout << "Please enter an altitude (0ft - 50,000ft):  \n"; 
 cin >> setbase(10) >> altitude; 
 altitude = (altitude + 1000)/25; 
 hold = (altitude & 0x00F); 
 altitude = (altitude & 0xFF0) << 1; 
 altitude = (altitude | hold); //concatenate to the entire message 
 altitude = (altitude | 0x010); 
 altitude = (altitude | 0x58000); //Takes on the TC (0x58) field 
 
return altitude; 
} 
 
 
long int GenerateAircraftID() 
{  
 long int address; 
 long int df17; 
 cout << "Enter an aircraft ID 3 Bytes (Example: BEEF11): \n"; 
 cin >> setbase(16); 
 cout << setbase(16); 
 cin >>  address; 
 df17 = 0x8D;  
 df17 = df17 << 24; 
 df17 = (df17 | address); 
 
return df17;  
} 
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long int CalculateCRC112BitsOdd() 
{ 
 long poly = 0xFFFA0480; 
 long int a = completeMessageOdd[0]; 
 long int a2 = completeMessageOdd[1]; 
 long int a3 = completeMessageOdd[2]; 
 int j; 
 long int b = a2; 
 long int c = a3; 
 long int d; 
 long int hold; 
 
 b = b << 12; 
 d = (c & 0xFFF000000); 
 d = d >> 24; 
 a2 = (b | d); 
 hold = (a3 & 0x000FFFFFF); 
 hold = hold << 8; 
 a3 = hold; 
 
 
 
 for (j=1; j <= 88; j++)   
  { 
   if((a & 0x80000000) != 0) 
   {    
    a = a ^ poly; 
   } 
   a = a << 1;    
          if((a2 & 0x80000000) != 0)  
   {  
    a = a|1; 
   } 
   a2 = a2 << 1; 
          if((a3 & 0x80000000) != 0) 
   {  
    a2 = a2|1; 
   } 
   a3 = a3 << 1;    
  } 
 completeMessageOdd[3] = a; 
return 0; 
} 
 
long int CalculateCRC112BitsEven() 
{ 
 long poly = 0xFFFA0480; 
 long int a = completeMessageEven[0]; 
 long int a2 = completeMessageEven[1]; 
 long int a3 = completeMessageEven[2];  
 int j; 
 long int b = a2; 
 long int c = a3; 
 long int d; 
 long int hold; 
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 b = b << 12; //Bit manipulation to push the message together 
 d = (c & 0xFFF000000); 
 d = d >> 24; 
 a2 = (b | d); 
 hold = (a3 & 0x000FFFFFF); 
 hold = hold << 8; 
 a3 = hold; 
 
 for (j=1; j <= 88; j++)   
  { 
   if((a & 0x80000000) != 0) 
   {    
    a = a ^ poly; 
   } 
   a = a << 1;    
          if((a2 & 0x80000000) != 0)  
   {  
    a = a|1; 
   } 
   a2 = a2 << 1; 
          if((a3 & 0x80000000) != 0) 
   {  
    a2 = a2|1; 
   } 
   a3 = a3 << 1;    
  } 
 completeMessageEven[3] = a; 
return 0; 
} 
 
long int ConvertForHexEditor(long int a, long int b, long int c, long 
int d) 
{ 
 long int ACID = a; 
 int i = 1; 
 int m = 2; 
 while (i<=8) 
 { 
  ACID = (ACID & 0xF0000000); 
  if (ACID == 0x00000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x55; 
  else if (ACID == 0x10000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x56; 
  else if (ACID == 0x20000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x59; 
  else if (ACID == 0x30000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x5A; 
  else if (ACID == 0x40000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x65; 
  else if (ACID == 0x50000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x66; 
  else if (ACID == 0x60000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x69; 
  else if (ACID == 0x70000000) 
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   buffer[m] = 0x6A; 
  else if (ACID == 0x80000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x95; 
  else if (ACID == 0x90000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x96; 
  else if (ACID == 0xA0000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x99; 
  else if (ACID == 0xB0000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x9A; 
  else if (ACID == 0xC0000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0xA5; 
  else if (ACID == 0xD0000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0xA6; 
  else if (ACID == 0xE0000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0xA9; 
  else if (ACID == 0xF0000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0xAA; 
  else  
    
 
  ACID = a; 
  ACID = (ACID << (i*4)); 
  i++; 
  m++; 
 }  
 cout << " "; 
 ACID = b; 
 ACID = (ACID << 12); 
 i = 4; 
 while (i<=8) 
 { 
  ACID = (ACID & 0xF0000000); 
  if (ACID == 0x00000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x55; 
  else if (ACID == 0x10000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x56; 
  else if (ACID == 0x20000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x59; 
  else if (ACID == 0x30000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x5A; 
  else if (ACID == 0x40000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x65; 
  else if (ACID == 0x50000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x66; 
  else if (ACID == 0x60000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x69; 
  else if (ACID == 0x70000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x6A; 
  else if (ACID == 0x80000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x95; 
  else if (ACID == 0x90000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x96; 
  else if (ACID == 0xA0000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x99; 
  else if (ACID == 0xB0000000) 
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   buffer[m] = 0x9A; 
  else if (ACID == 0xC0000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0xA5; 
  else if (ACID == 0xD0000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0xA6; 
  else if (ACID == 0xE0000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0xA9; 
  else if (ACID == 0xF0000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0xAA; 
  else  
    
  ACID = b; 
  ACID = (ACID << (i*4)); 
  i++; 
  m++; 
 }  
 cout << " "; 
  
 ACID = c; 
 i = 1; 
 while (i<=9) 
 { 
  ACID = (ACID & 0xF00000000); 
  if (ACID == 0x000000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x55; 
  else if (ACID == 0x100000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x56; 
  else if (ACID == 0x200000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x59; 
  else if (ACID == 0x300000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x5A; 
  else if (ACID == 0x400000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x65; 
  else if (ACID == 0x500000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x66; 
  else if (ACID == 0x600000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x69; 
  else if (ACID == 0x700000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x6A; 
  else if (ACID == 0x800000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x95; 
  else if (ACID == 0x900000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x96; 
  else if (ACID == 0xA00000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x99; 
  else if (ACID == 0xB00000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x9A; 
  else if (ACID == 0xC00000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0xA5; 
  else if (ACID == 0xD00000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0xA6; 
  else if (ACID == 0xE00000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0xA9; 
  else if (ACID == 0xF00000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0xAA; 
78 
  else  
    
 
   
  ACID = c; 
  ACID = (ACID << (i*4)); 
  i++; 
  m++; 
 }  
 cout << " "; 
  
 ACID = d; 
 i = 1; 
 
 while (i<=6) 
 { 
  ACID = (ACID & 0xF0000000); 
   
  if (ACID == 0x00000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x55; 
  else if (ACID == 0x10000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x56; 
  else if (ACID == 0x20000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x59; 
  else if (ACID == 0x30000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x5A; 
  else if (ACID == 0x40000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x65; 
  else if (ACID == 0x50000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x66; 
  else if (ACID == 0x60000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x69; 
  else if (ACID == 0x70000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x6A; 
  else if (ACID == 0x80000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x95; 
  else if (ACID == 0x90000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x96; 
  else if (ACID == 0xA0000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x99; 
  else if (ACID == 0xB0000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0x9A; 
  else if (ACID == 0xC0000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0xA5; 
  else if (ACID == 0xD0000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0xA6; 
  else if (ACID == 0xE0000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0xA9; 
  else if (ACID == 0xF0000000) 
   buffer[m] = 0xAA; 
  else  
    
 
   
  ACID = d; 
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  ACID = (ACID << (i*4)); 
  i++; 
  m++; 
 }  
 cout << "\n"; 
} 
 
long int GenerateCompleteDF17Message() 
{ 
 long int address; 
 long int altitude; 
 long int position; 
 long int crcBits; 
 
 
 //Generate Aircraft ID and store in our buffer 
 address = GenerateAircraftID(); 
 completeMessageOdd[0] = address; 
 completeMessageEven[0] = address; 
 
 //Generate Altitude and store in our buffer 
 altitude = CalculateAltitude(); 
 completeMessageOdd[1] = altitude; 
 completeMessageEven[1] = altitude; 
 
 //Generate the Latitude and Longitude Bits, functions will store 
 values in our buffer 
 CalculateLatBitsEven(); 
 
 //Generate the CRC bits and store them in our buffer  
 CalculateCRC112BitsOdd(); 
 CalculateCRC112BitsEven(); 
 
  
 //Can be used for troubleshooting purposes if you need to see the 
 odd message remove comments from code below. 
 //cout << setbase(16) << "Odd Message : " << 
 completeMessageOdd[0] << " " << completeMessageOdd[1] << " " << 
 completeMessageOdd[2] << " " <<   //completeMessageOdd[3] 
 << "\n"; 
 
 //Convert for easy entry into hex file 
 ConvertForHexEditor(completeMessageEven[0],completeMessageEven[1]
,completeMessageEven[2],completeMessageEven[3]); 
 ofstream myfile; 
  myfile.open ("FinalMessage.bin", ios::binary | ios::app); 
   myfile.write(buffer, 30); 
   myfile.close(); 
 system("dd if=/dev/zero of=zeroes.bin bs=10 count=10"); 
 system("cat FinalMessage.bin zeroes.bin > SecondaryMessage.bin"); 
 
 //Can be used for troubelshotting purposes if you need to see the 
 even message. 
 //cout << setbase(16) << "ADS-B Message : " << 
 completeMessageEven[0] << " " << completeMessageEven[1] << " " << 
80 
 completeMessageEven[2] << " " <<  
 //completeMessageEven[3] << "\n";   
 
 ConvertForHexEditor(completeMessageOdd[0],completeMessageOdd[1], 
 completeMessageOdd[2],completeMessageOdd[3]); 
  myfile.open ("SecondaryMessage.bin", ios::binary | ios::app); 
   myfile.write(buffer, 30); 
   myfile.close(); 
 system("cat SecondaryMessage.bin zeroes.bin > FinalMessage.bin"); 
  
 //clean up 
 system("rm SecondaryMessage.bin"); 
 system("rm zeroes.bin"); 
 cout << "\n"; 
 cout << "The ADS-B Message has been generated and is ready for 
 transmission." << "\n"; 
 return 0;  
} 
 
 
 
 
int main() 
{ 
 int choice; 
 int exit = 0; 
 system("clear"); 
 cout << "This program will generate a Mode-S Downlink Format 17 
 Message, also known\nas an Automatic Dependenet Surveillance 
 Broadcast (ADS-B) Message.\n";  
 
 
 while(exit ==0) 
 { 
 cout << "Press 1 <ENTER> to begin message generator.\n"; 
 cin >> choice; 
 if (choice == 1) 
 {             
 printf("#########################################################
 ## \n", GenerateCompleteDF17Message()); 
 } 
 
 else 
 { 
 printf("Exiting.............\n"); 
 exit = 1; 
 } 
 } 
  
 return 0; 
} 
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